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Abstract 
In this paper we examine selected types of vulnerability over the human life course with 
a specific focus on differentials not only by age and gender – as is conventionally done 
in demography – but also by level of education and with a focus on health. 
Starting with the newborn and vulnerability in terms of infant and child mortality, we 
refer to the level of education of the mother. In reference to young people’s 
susceptibility to unemployment after leaving school, we take into account the education 
of the women and men themselves. Proceeding further in the life course, we next 
consider vulnerability to becoming disabled in the age group 30-74 according to the 
education level of the studied persons themselves. Finally, the last section studies 
differential vulnerability at the national level using the time series of deaths from 
disasters where the aggregate levels of education at a national level are being taken into 
account. 
We conclude that over the entire life cycle of individuals, the changes in behavior that 
tend to be associated with more education (of mothers or the persons themselves) can be 
viewed as a potent factor in reducing child mortality, reducing the risk for 
unemployment at young age, reducing the vulnerability to natural disasters, and finally 
reducing the risk of falling into disability. These general long-term benefits of near-term 
investments in education hold for individuals as well as for entire societies. 
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Reducing Vulnerability in Critical Life Course Phases through 
Enhancing Human Capital 
Samir KC 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Elke Loichinger 
Raya Muttarak 
Erich Strießnig 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we will examine vulnerability over the life course with a specific focus on 
differentials not only by age and gender – as is conventionally done in demography – 
but also by level of education and with a focus on health. Indeed, there is a significant 
body of scientific literature showing that the changes in mental functioning, cognitive 
capacity, and behavior that typically result from education all lead to reduced 
vulnerability to virtually all threats to human life and wellbeing at all stages of the life 
course. Hence, reducing vulnerability through educational attainment should be a key 
strategy for international policies formulated with the goal of not only empowering 
people but also providing the manifold positive consequences of education at an 
individual as well as a societal level. 
There are certainly many other factors in addition to education that influence 
vulnerability to the hazards discussed in this paper. Conventionally, economists and 
other social scientists have seen income as the primary determinant of vulnerability and 
many studies on differential vulnerability have examined variations with respect to 
economic standing often without testing empirically whether other observable 
individual or household characteristics might be more important. Place of residence, 
age, gender, size of household and social capital are among several other factors that 
have been studied in this context and have been shown to have some independent 
effects. A review the vast literature on these different factors is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, recently at the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global 
Human Capital, a series of studies have been carried out to systematically assess the 
relative importance of education compared to income and the other above mentioned 
characteristics in reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience. In cases ranging from 
infant mortality to disability in old age and from being affected by Malaria to falling 
victim to natural disasters, education has turned out to be the key characteristic in 
reducing such vulnerability. These and other relevant studies will be discussed below in 
the sections dealing with specific vulnerabilities. 
In a recent review, a significant amount evidence has been brought together 
demonstrating that the effects of education on better health and survival and several 
other desirable goals are indeed functionally causal (Lutz and Skirbekk in Lutz et al. 
2014, Chapter 2). In this review, findings from so-called natural experiments are 
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summarized. While such evidence clearly strengthens the case for assuming a general 
functional causal relationship through the illustration that the mechanisms work in the 
expected direction under many different conditions, they fall short of establishing a 
strong causal relationship for all societies at all points in time. When such experiments 
demonstrate causality for one specific population group in one country at one point in 
time, it is far from clear that this proven relationship also holds in very different cultures 
at different stages of social and economic development. Hence, in order to use such 
relationships as a basis for projections of the future effects of education in all countries 
in the world, we should not aim at demonstrating strong causality but rather focus on 
establishing functional causality through assessing the following three criteria as 
specified by Lutz and Skirbekk (2014): 
(a) There must be strong empirically observed associations between the two 
factors studied and these associations should hold across different societies and for 
different sub-groups of the population as well as for different points in time 
(considering the appropriate lag structures). The case for the assumption of a causal 
relationship is significantly strengthened if this association is observed both at the 
individual level (across people and households) and the aggregate level (across 
societies), in particular when it can be found in longitudinal cohort studies.  
(b) There must be a plausible narrative about the mechanisms by which one 
force influences the other. This explanation must also give specific attention to the 
sequence and timing of events according to the general principle that the cause must 
always transpire before the consequence. In the social sciences it is important to 
consider that the expectation of a coming event also qualifies as a cause of behavior 
and not only the event itself. Along these lines, there is support from neurology that 
education changes the physiology of our brains and hence our perception of the 
world, our processing of that information, and in consequence, our behavior.  
(c) Other obvious competing explanations for the observed associations should be 
explicitly and systematically studied and ruled out as explaining the overall pattern 
of the observed associations. This does not rule out that such other forces play a 
minor and non-dominant role. The two main alternative explanations of observed 
associations are self-selection and reverse causality.  
Lutz and Skirbekk (Forthcoming) demonstrate that these three criteria are being 
met in the case of education effects on health, mortality, and fertility. The foundations 
of the effects of education on human behavior are derived from modern cognitive 
neuroscience where it has shown that every learning experience and in particular 
repeated experiences physiologically change our brains by building new synapses that 
not only store the information content but also become an integral part of what forms 
our sense of personality (Kandel 2007). While neuroscience still lacks a comprehensive 
understanding of the process of learning, neurological studies have confirmed beyond a 
doubt that brain volumes, cortical thickness, and neurological structures can be affected 
by more education. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the cognitive functions 
that relate to our perception of the environment around us, our view of the future, and 
our degree of rationality are also affected by our previous education experiences. In 
particular, empirical studies show that better educated individuals tend to have a longer 
investment horizon and be more risk adverse (van der Pol 2011). 
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It should also therefore be plausible to extend this reasoning to education, as a 
driver of the other outcome variables studied in this paper, namely the probability of 
finding a job and general resilience to natural disasters. In all cases, education is 
associated with a higher degree of abstraction and counterfactual thinking that is 
necessary to prepare for risks that the person has not yet experienced but that can be 
reasonably assumed to pose a potential danger. When it comes to education and the 
possibility of finding a job, in addition to the cognitive effect and the additional skills 
that are being acquired through education, there is also a so-called signaling effect. This 
effect implies that employers prefer to recruit people with a prestigious degree even 
though there is no evidence that their skill levels are actually higher. 
In this paper vulnerability refers to being susceptible to or unable to cope with 
the adverse effects of hostile environment such as natural hazards, economic crisis, or 
persistent poverty. Specifically, we address vulnerability across four different life 
domains: infant mortality, youth unemployment, adult disability, and disaster deaths. 
While vulnerability may be specific to some types of hazards, people of certain socio-
demographic characteristics are generally more vulnerable than others. For instance, 
young people are more susceptible to unemployment during the economic downturn 
whereas older adults, especially women, have a higher risk of disability. In all four 
cases we present evidence from different parts of the world and different stages of 
development examining how vulnerability varies by level of education. For three of the 
topics we also combine the assessments of the effects of education with alternative 
educational attainment scenarios to demonstrate quantitatively how investments in 
education can lead to fewer avoidable deaths and disabilities in the future. 
For assessing the impact of alternative possible future education trends, we refer 
to the education scenarios as they were designated in the IIASA paper for the Human 
Development Report 2013 as well as a forthcoming book at Oxford University Press 
(Lutz et al. 2014). These scenarios are now also being utilized for the new set of global 
SSPs (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways) as they have recently been developed for the 
global climate change modeling community (Lutz 2012). Because these scenarios are 
being employed in three of the following four sections, we summarize them briefly here 
in the introduction: 
The Global Education Trend (GET) scenario is based on a Bayesian model that 
estimates the most likely future trajectory in education-specific progression rates to 
higher levels from the cumulative experience of all countries over the past 40 years. The 
resulting education trajectories for each country are not only considered to be the 
“medium”, but are also used as the standard against which all future education-specific 
fertility and mortality trajectories are being derived. 
In addition to GET, there are two other benchmark scenarios with respect to 
future education trends. The Constant Enrollment Rates (CER) simply assumes that in 
each country the most recently observed levels of school enrollment, and hence 
educational progression, are frozen at their current levels. Since in many countries the 
younger age groups are much better educated than the older ones, even this scenario can 
lead to some improvements in adult education levels over the coming decades, but in 
the longer run implies stagnation. 
On the other extreme, there is the Fast Track (FT) scenario which assumes that 
the country will shift gears and follow the most rapid education expansion experienced 
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in recent history, namely that of South Korea. In addition to the three benchmark 
scenarios, a fourth scenario, namely Constant Enrollment Number (CEN), is the worst-
case scenario in that it assumes zero expansion of schooling. In the context of 
population growth, this implies that the proportion of children enrolled in school is 
actually declining over time. 
In the following four sections of this paper we will follow the individual life 
course as we examine education specific vulnerabilities. Starting with the newborn and 
the vulnerability to infant and child mortality, we refer to the level of education of the 
mother and of the child. In reference to young people’s susceptibility to unemployment 
after leaving school, we take into account the education of the women and men 
themselves. Proceeding further in the life course, we next consider vulnerability to 
becoming disabled in the age group 30-74 according to the education level of the 
studied persons themselves. Finally, the last section studies differential vulnerability at 
the level of national time series of deaths from disasters where the aggregate levels of 
education at a national level are being taken into account. Most of the studies presented 
are updated and further enriched versions of earlier published analyses on these topics 
by the authors. 
2 Differential Infant and Child Mortality by Maternal Education 
When new citizens of the world are born, the first months of their life are also the most 
dangerous months of their entire life. In most populations of the world, peri-natal 
mortality is higher than mortality in any of the subsequent periods of life. But even if 
these new citizens can survive these dangerous first months, their mortality risks are 
still elevated until around the age of five years, particularly in developing countries. The 
reason for this high risk lies primarily in a higher vulnerability to diarrheal diseases and 
other infectious diseases often transmitted by unclean water as well as resulting from 
nutritional deficits. Since these young children are entirely dependent on the care of 
adults – in most cases their mothers – the educational level of the mother has been 
shown to be a key determinant of the vulnerability of children during their first period 
of life. 
The strong negative association between the level of female education and 
fertility as well as child mortality rates is well established in the literature and described 
in full detail in the forthcoming book by Lutz et al. (2014). Here, a case is made for 
assuming a direct causal effect from the empowerment of women through basic 
education to changes in attitudes, behavior, and the relative standing of women in their 
partnership, extended family, and society that result in the observed lower levels of 
fertility and child mortality rates. 
Given this clear relationship between female education and demographic 
outcomes, we should expect that alternative scenarios about future education trends of 
women will result in different levels of fertility and mortality. In the following tables 
and graphs we will quantify these effects which – with regard to population growth – go 
in opposite directions. Higher female education reduces birth rates and at the same time 
improves the chances of survival for children already born. Yet the calculation below 
shows that the relationship between education and fertility is far more important than 
that between education and improved child survival, and as a result, better education is 
associated with a clear reduction in population growth. 
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This relationship is shown in Table 1 for a number of least-developed countries 
by comparing different demographic outcomes across different education scenarios. 
Under the most likely GET scenario, for Ethiopia the table shows that population will 
increase from 83 million in 2010 to 172 million by 2060, which is more than a doubling 
of the population due to current high fertility rates and a very young age structure. 
Under the FT scenario, the population in 2060 would only be 151 million, i.e. more than 
20 million less even when assuming identical education-specific fertility rates. Under 
the most pessimistic CEN scenario, however, the population would increase to 194 
million. This implies that by 2060 the difference between the highest and the lowest 
education scenarios would be 43 million people, which is more than half of the current 
population of Ethiopia.  
Table 1 also lists the absolute number of births under the different education 
scenarios, which illustrates the reasons for these major differences in the population 
growth trajectories. By about 2060, the number of births would be more than twice as 
high under the CEN scenario (1.77 million) than under the FT scenario (0.88 million). 
As discussed above, the effect of different numbers of births on total population growth 
is moderated by the differences in mortality that result from different levels of 
education. The last columns of the table show that the number of child deaths under the 
age of five would be 120,000 under the FT scenario as compared to 363,000 under 
CER, and 403,000 under CEN.  
Table 1. Different Demographic Outcomes as a Consequence of Different Education 
Scenarios for a Number of Least-Developed Countries (Medium Fertility Assumptions) 
  
Population (in million) Births (in'00,000)* Under 5 mortality (in '000)* 
 Year GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN 
Benin 2010 9 9 9 9 18 18 17 18 114 116 112 115 
Benin 2030 14 14 14 14 19 20 17 20 83 95 67 97 
Benin 2060 21 22 19 22 17 19 13 20 38 52 23 55 
              Burkina Faso 2010 16 16 16 16 36 37 35 36 270 275 262 272 
Burkina Faso 2030 27 28 26 28 43 48 35 48 220 252 160 251 
Burkina Faso 2060 43 47 37 47 40 49 28 49 98 142 54 143 
               Burundi 2010 8 8 8 8 15 15 15 15 123 122 120 122 
Burundi 2030 13 13 13 13 15 16 13 16 96 105 77 105 
Burundi 2060 19 19 17 19 14 15 10 15 46 58 27 60 
              Chad 2010 11 11 11 11 26 26 26 26 261 263 257 262 
Chad 2030 18 18 18 18 30 32 27 32 230 249 187 250 
Chad 2060 27 29 25 29 26 30 20 30 112 151 71 153 
              DR Congo 2010 66 66 66 66 151 154 148 154 1444 1473 1396 1469 
DR Congo 2030 107 109 104 109 170 186 151 191 1301 1561 1007 1642 
DR Congo 2060 160 169 149 171 145 174 118 181 671 1000 444 1113 
               Ethiopia 2010 83 83 83 83 140 142 139 143 722 727 710 731 
Ethiopia 2030 124 127 120 128 149 166 121 172 526 608 391 633 
Ethiopia 2060 172 188 151 194 129 166 88 177 234 363 120 403 
              Guinea 2010 10 10 10 10 19 19 18 19 137 139 129 137 
Guinea 2030 13 14 13 14 17 19 15 18 86 102 64 98 
Guinea 2060 16 17 15 17 12 14 9 14 34 49 21 47 
              Haiti 2010 10 10 10 10 13 13 12 13 52 53 50 53 
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Population (in million) Births (in'00,000)* Under 5 mortality (in '000)* 
 Year GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN 
Haiti 2030 12 12 12 12 11 12 10 12 26 33 21 32 
Haiti 2060 13 14 13 14 8 10 7 9 8 13 6 13 
              Madagascar 2010 21 21 21 21 36 36 35 36 93 91 89 92 
Madagascar 2030 33 33 32 34 40 42 35 44 66 70 49 75 
Madagascar 2060 50 51 44 53 37 40 26 43 34 40 17 45 
              Malawi 2010 15 15 15 15 34 34 33 35 204 207 200 209 
Malawi 2030 26 27 25 27 48 52 40 56 204 238 152 268 
Malawi 2060 48 53 42 57 52 67 38 77 141 223 86 285 
              Mali 2010 15 15 15 15 36 37 35 37 321 326 309 323 
Mali 2030 26 26 25 26 42 45 34 45 259 294 186 292 
Mali 2060 40 43 35 43 36 43 26 43 120 171 64 171 
              Mozambique 2010 23 23 23 23 43 44 41 43 290 292 277 290 
Mozambique 2030 34 35 33 35 44 49 38 49 186 217 136 218 
Mozambique 2060 46 49 41 49 38 46 27 46 84 124 47 127 
              Niger 2010 16 16 16 16 40 40 39 40 284 286 278 285 
Niger 2030 30 30 29 30 63 67 54 67 330 360 266 362 
Niger 2060 62 67 54 67 78 92 58 93 250 331 150 340 
              Rwanda 2010 11 11 11 11 22 22 21 22 138 141 131 139 
Rwanda 2030 17 17 16 17 24 27 20 27 113 133 80 135 
Rwanda 2060 26 28 23 28 23 28 17 29 58 86 32 91 
              Senegal 2010 12 12 12 12 23 24 22 24 107 110 100 107 
Senegal 2030 19 20 18 20 25 29 20 28 81 99 52 96 
Senegal 2060 27 31 23 30 22 29 15 29 31 50 15 49 
              Sierra Leone 2010 6 6 6 6 11 11 11 11 93 94 89 93 
Sierra Leone 2030 9 9 8 9 12 12 10 13 68 78 50 79 
Sierra Leone 2060 12 13 11 13 10 12 7 12 33 46 19 48 
               Somalia 2010 9 9 9 9 20 20 19 20 174 177 170 176 
Somalia 2030 13 14 13 14 21 23 17 24 146 175 107 181 
Somalia 2060 17 19 15 19 15 20 11 20 64 107 37 113 
              Sudan 2010 44 44 44 44 71 71 70 71 331 329 322 330 
Sudan 2030 65 65 64 65 74 78 68 80 267 309 212 325 
Sudan 2060 88 91 84 92 63 75 53 78 148 233 103 256 
              Uganda 2010 33 33 33 33 80 83 76 81 480 495 456 486 
Uganda 2030 60 62 57 62 111 125 93 127 488 582 349 600 
Uganda 2060 109 122 93 123 120 154 88 160 278 419 162 459 
              Tanzania 2010 45 45 45 45 91 94 88 93 396 407 382 402 
Tanzania 2030 73 75 70 75 107 117 91 120 273 314 207 330 
Tanzania 2060 114 122 99 124 100 117 71 123 145 190 82 209 
              Zambia 2010 13 13 13 13 30 31 28 31 207 217 194 213 
Zambia 2030 21 22 20 22 37 43 29 44 187 234 120 250 
Zambia 2060 33 38 28 39 34 46 24 50 96 157 52 185 
              Bangladesh 2010 149 149 149 149 154 154 152 154 406 408 390 406 
Bangladesh 2030 179 179 177 179 128 133 119 132 164 187 128 182 
Bangladesh 2060 189 194 182 193 88 102 75 100 49 70 34 65 
              Cambodia 2010 14 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 58 58 57 58 
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Population (in million) Births (in'00,000)* Under 5 mortality (in '000)* 
 Year GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN GET CER FT CEN 
Cambodia 2030 17 17 17 17 14 14 13 14 22 24 18 24 
Cambodia 2060 19 19 18 19 10 11 8 12 7 10 4 10 
              Laos 2010 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 21 21 20 21 
Laos 2030 8 8 8 8 7 7 6 7 13 14 9 14 
Laos 2060 9 9 8 9 5 6 4 6 5 6 3 6 
              Myanmar 2010 48 48 48 48 40 40 38 40 147 147 139 146 
Myanmar 2030 52 52 51 52 32 34 27 33 77 86 51 80 
Myanmar 2060 47 49 44 48 23 27 18 25 24 34 14 28 
              Nepal 2010 30 30 30 30 38 40 37 39 64 69 60 66 
Nepal 2030 42 43 41 43 37 43 34 42 24 35 20 33 
Nepal 2060 55 61 52 60 31 43 27 41 9 19 7 18 
              *for period measures, “Year” is the end of the five year period (e.g. 2060 refers to 2055-2060) 
Hence, even under the CER scenario that assumes that school expansion can 
keep pace with population growth, the absolute number of child deaths is estimated to 
be three times higher compared to the fastest case of education expansion. In this sense, 
the expansion of female education does not only have significant consequences on 
population growth and development in general, it also has massive direct effects on 
child mortality. 
So far, all discussions of the impact of alternative education scenarios have been 
combined with medium (the most likely) education-specific fertility and mortality 
assumptions. But the positive effects of education can be expected to be even stronger 
because future education-specific fertility rates would follow a higher trajectory 
(defined as gradual increases to a point of 20 percent higher than the “medium” by 
2030, and 25 percent different by 2050 and thereafter) due to the higher absolute 
differences between the birth rates of the different education categories. 
In Table 2 below, we briefly discuss the consequences of this case with an in-
depth examination of two countries from the above table. In Ethiopia under the most 
pessimistic education scenario, CEN combined with high fertility, not only would 
population grow to the extremely high level of 238 million by 2060, but as the table 
shows child mortality would be catastrophically high with 638,000 child deaths in 2060-
65 as compared to the much lower number if 186,000 child deaths under the optimistic 
FT scenario. In other words these two different education scenarios result in projected 
child deaths that differ by a factor of 3.4 even when assuming identical trajectories of 
education-specific child mortality rates. The result is not so different for Nepal where 
under the CER and CEN scenarios, almost three times as many children will be dying in 
2060-65 than under the most optimistic FT scenario.  This illustrates clearly that 
mothers’ education can indeed be a key factor in reducing child mortality in the future 
in the context of least developed countries. 
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Table 2. Different Child Mortality Outcomes as a Consequence of Different Education 
Scenarios for Ethiopia and Nepal (High Fertility Assumptions) 
  Under 5 mortality (in '000)* 
 Year GET CER FT CEN 
Ethiopia 2010 747 754 737 758 
Ethiopia 2030 641 742 476 774 
Ethiopia 2060 361 562 186 638 
Nepal 2010 67 72 63 69 
Nepal 2030 30 43 24 41 
Nepal 2060 15 30 12 31 
 
These results dramatically illustrate how important progress in female education 
is for avoiding a significantly higher number of child deaths. It can even be argued that 
these figures represent an underestimation of the effects of education on child mortality 
because they only consider the individual level effects and not the community-level 
impacts of education. The literature has shown (Fuchs et al. 2010; Pamuk et al. 2011) 
that there are typically spillover effects – normative change in favor of family limitation 
and better availability of reproductive health services in communities with better 
educated women. Particularly in countries that have experienced the most rapid 
voluntary fertility declines—such as Iran, Mauritius, and South Korea—these 
community-level effects were highly relevant. A multilevel analysis of 22 countries in 
sub-Sahara Africa shows that an additional fertility decline of up to one child per 
woman is attributable to the aggregate-level effect of female education in addition to the 
individual-level effects (Fuchs et al. 2010; Pamuk et al. 2011) . 
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that the interaction between education and 
population growth goes both ways. Under the CEN scenario of high population growth 
due to high birth rates, the increase in the school age population is such that even 
maintaining current school enrollment rates can be an uphill battle. In several African 
countries during the 1980s, the proportions of young cohorts in school actually 
declined, presumably because of the combination of cuts in education efforts due to 
economic and political problems and very rapid population growth, resulting in an 
increase in the younger out of school population (Lutz & KC 2013). The stall of the 
fertility decline observed in some African countries around 2000 was associated with 
this stall in education of the relevant female cohorts. Although female education is an 
important force in lowering fertility, rapid growth in the number of children in a society 
in which resources do not grow at the same pace is an obstacle to the expansion of 
education. For this reason, it is most effective from a policy perspective to try to 
increase female education while at the same time improving access to family planning 
programs. 
In conclusion, this section has clearly demonstrated that improving maternal 
education is a key strategy in reducing future child vulnerability to (by definition) 
premature mortality. The scenarios presented here up to 2060 under alternative 
education assumptions – but identical education-specific mortality rates – show that 
under the pessimistic education scenarios there will be 3-4 times more child deaths in 
many of the least developed countries than under the scenarios assuming rapid 
improvements in education among young women. 
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3 Youth Unemployment by Level of Education 
Another critical and vulnerable period in the life course of young people is the transition 
from the years of education (assuming that they are in countries that offer basic 
education) into the labor market. In many countries of the world this transition is made 
quite difficult by high levels of youth unemployment. This situation has been 
dramatically worsened as a consequence of the recent economic crisis even in some of 
the richest industrialized countries. Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to get reliable 
statistical information on the levels of unemployment by age, gender, and level of 
education for many developing countries. While in Europe there are regular and 
comparable labor force and employment surveys, virtually no such data sources exist 
for developing countries. Initial efforts by the authors of this paper to extract relevant 
information from the public use samples of selected censuses in developing countries 
turned out to unfeasible for an education-specific analysis of unemployment. For this 
reason the following analysis will only focus on European countries for which Eurostat 
provides consistent time-series data of unemployment by level of education as well as 
the USA. 
3.1 Background: Youth Unemployment and Education 
Youth unemployment is an indicator of young people experiencing difficulties in the 
transition from education to employment. When the economic conditions are not 
favorable for job creation, young people in particular experience difficulties in finding 
and keeping jobs.  
The OECD report entitled Education at a glance (2013, p.13) emphasizes the 
importance of education in reducing the vulnerability of young people: “The 
distribution of unemployment within the younger generation sheds light on some of the 
factors that may increase the risk of joblessness, which, in turn, offers insights for 
policy responses. Most notably, educational attainment has a huge impact on 
employability, and the crisis has strengthened this impact even further. On average 
across OECD countries, 4.8% of individuals with a tertiary degree were unemployed in 
2011, while 12.6% of those lacking a secondary education were. Between 2008 and 
2011 the unemployment gap between those with low levels of education and those with 
high levels of education widened: across all age groups, the unemployment rate for low-
educated individuals increased by almost 3.8 percentage points, while it increased by 
only 1.5 percentage points for highly educated individuals. Without the foundation 
skills provided by a minimum level of education, people find themselves particularly 
vulnerable in an insecure labor market.” 
There are several mechanisms that result in this pattern of generally lower 
unemployment for more highly educated younger people. First, structural change in the 
economies of many countries leads to new job creation in sectors such as ICT that 
typically require higher skills. Secondly, when employers have a choice between a 
better and lower skilled person for any given job it is a rational decision to offer the job 
to the better skilled person in the expectation that he/she will be more productive for a 
given salary level. But on top of this effect of higher skills, it has also be argued that 
there is a “signaling effect” which leads to the recruitment of people with better 
education on paper even when the actual skills have not been tested. This can also lead 
to a crowding out effect in which under conditions of a tight labor market more jobs are 
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given to people with better education thus resulting in relatively higher unemployment 
for those with lower levels of formal education. All these factors are contributing to the 
described education differentials in unemployment. 
But the pattern can also differ by the stage of economic development of a 
country. While there is ample evidence that higher education increases the chances of 
employment in advanced economies, for developing countries several studies suggest 
that “the nature of educational enrollment, attainment, and employment may be very 
different in rapidly changing societies, and these relationships are likely to change 
across historical time” (Yabiku & Schlabach 2009, p.537). In transitioning societies, 
meaning those that are moving out of being predominantly agrarian, education systems 
often produce graduates faster than the economy can adjust, leading to a shortage of job 
opportunities in the formal sector for individuals with higher education. Two factors 
that contribute to this phenomenon in a number of developing countries are the high 
aspirations for finding a prestigious job that are often associated with higher formal 
education and a situation where the chosen field of study does not match the demand by 
the labor market. It is not unusual that graduates in one field have serious difficulties 
finding an appropriate job while in other fields there is a lack of qualified graduates.  
3.2 Empirical Evidence from Europe 
As discussed above, the empirical data on trends in youth unemployment by level of 
education is very unevenly distributed. While for Europe consistent data exist for a large 
number of countries (as provided by Eurostat1), for developing countries it is very hard 
to find any such data as all.  
Table 3. Youth (Ages 15 To 24) and Adult (Ages 25 To 64) Unemployment Rate, 2008 
and 2012 (Source: EUROSTAT Database; Based on Labor Force Survey Data) 
 2008 2012 
Country 
15 to 
24 
years 
old 
25 to 
64 
years 
old 
difference between 
youth and adult 
unemployment 
rate (in percentage 
points) 
15 to 
24 
years 
old 
25 to 
64 
years 
old 
difference between 
youth and adult 
unemployment 
rate (in percentage 
points) 
Austria 8 3.2 4.8 8.7 3.7 5 
Belgium 18 5.9 12.1 19.8 6.5 13.3 
Bulgaria 12.7 5 7.7 28.1 11.1 17 
Croatia 21.9 7 14.9 43 13.6 29.4 
Cyprus 9 3.2 5.8 27.8 10.4 17.4 
Czech Republic 9.9 4 5.9 19.5 6.1 13.4 
Denmark 8 2.6 5.4 14.1 6.5 7.6 
Estonia 12 4.7 7.3 20.9 9.1 11.8 
EU 27 15.6 6 9.6 22.8 9.2 13.6 
Finland 16.5 5 11.5 19 6.2 12.8 
                                                 
1 „EUROSTAT database, data retrieved June 25, 2013, from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database“ 
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 2008 2012 
Country 
15 to 
24 
years 
old 
25 to 
64 
years 
old 
difference between 
youth and adult 
unemployment 
rate (in percentage 
points) 
15 to 
24 
years 
old 
25 to 
64 
years 
old 
difference between 
youth and adult 
unemployment 
rate (in percentage 
points) 
The Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 56.4 30.7 25.7 53.9 28.4 25.5 
France 18.6 6.1 12.5 23.8 8.4 15.4 
Germany 10.6 7.2 3.4 8.1 5.2 2.9 
Greece 22.1 6.7 15.4 55.3 22.4 32.9 
Hungary 19.9 6.9 13 28.1 9.7 18.4 
Iceland 8.2 1.9 6.3 13.5 4.5 9 
Ireland 12.7 5 7.7 30.4 13.1 17.3 
Italy 21.3 5.6 15.7 35.3 9 26.3 
Latvia 13.1 6.9 6.2 28.4 13.8 14.6 
Lithuania 13.4 5 8.4 26.4 12.3 14.1 
Luxembourg 17.9 4 13.9 18.8 4.2 14.6 
Malta 12.2 4.7 7.5 14.2 5 9.2 
Netherlands 5.3 2.2 3.1 9.5 4.5 5 
Norway 7.5 1.8 5.7 8.5 2.3 6.2 
Poland 17.3 6 11.3 26.5 8.6 17.9 
Portugal 16.4 7.2 9.2 37.7 14.5 23.2 
Romania 18.6 4.7 13.9 22.7 5.8 16.9 
Slovakia 19 8.5 10.5 34 12.2 21.8 
Slovenia 10.4 3.7 6.7 20.6 8 12.6 
Spain 24.6 9.8 14.8 53.2 22.8 30.4 
Sweden 20.2 4.2 16 23.6 5.8 17.8 
Switzerland 7 2.8 4.2 8.4 3.6 4.8 
Turkey 18.5 8 10.5 15.7 6.9 8.8 
United Kingdom 15 4 11 21 5.8 15.2 
 
Table 3 shows that adult unemployment is significantly lower than youth 
unemployment in all European countries for which data are available. This clearly 
shows that the period of transition from education to entering the labor market is a 
particularly critical phase in the life cycle of all people. The burden of finding a job is 
usually placed entirely upon the young people themselves; concurrently, older people in 
existing employment contracts are typically well-protected by labor laws and hence the 
first reaction in times of economic difficulties for companies is to stop recruiting young 
people before considering sacking people that are already employed. Furthermore, when 
it comes to terminating employment contracts in times of crises, younger employees are 
frequently the ones that are more likely to lose their jobs, because they are often less 
protected by labor laws and cheaper to lay off than older workers.  
Figure 1 shows the development of youth unemployment in the European Union 
since the year 2000. The education differentials in unemployment vary over time, but at 
any point between 2000 and 2012, higher levels of education are associated with lower 
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levels of unemployment. The figure also clearly shows the effect of the economic crisis 
after the boom years until 2008. While youth unemployment rates increased for all 
education groups from 2009 onwards the sharp differences by level of education remain 
unaffected by the crisis, actually the differentials still widened a bit as a consequence of 
the crisis. At the level of the EU-27 the unemployment rate of young men and women in 
2012 was 30 percent for the lowest education groups, 20-23 percent for the intermediate 
education groups and only 18 percent for the highest education categories. In the 
following Table 4 and Figure 2 this pattern will be studied at the national level. 
  
Figure 1. Youth Unemployment Rate (Ages 15 To 24) for All EU27 Countries 
Combined and Selected Individual Countries, by Highest Level of Educational 
Attainment, 2000 to 2012 (Source: EUROSTAT Database) ISCED Levels 0 to 2 = Pre-
Primary, Primary and Lower Secondary Education; ISCED Levels 3 and 4 = Upper 
Secondary and Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary Education; ISCED Levels 5 and 6 = First 
and Second Stage of Tertiary Education 
Table 4. Youth Unemployment Rate (Ages 15 to 24), by Highest Level of Educational 
Attainment, 2012 (Source: EUROSTAT Database; Based on Labor Force Survey Data) 
 
Country All ISCED levels  
Pre-primary, 
primary and lower 
secondary 
education (ISCED 
levels 0 to 2) 
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-
tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 3 and 
4) 
First and second 
stage of tertiary 
education (ISCED 
levels 5 and 6) 
Total 
Austria 8.7 12.4 6.9 : 
Belgium 19.8 32.8 16.2 14 
Bulgaria 28.1 46.5 26.5 : 
Croatia 43 61.5 (u) 42.1 45 (u) 
Cyprus 27.8 30.1 25.1 30.5 
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Country All ISCED levels  
Pre-primary, 
primary and lower 
secondary 
education (ISCED 
levels 0 to 2) 
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-
tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 3 and 
4) 
First and second 
stage of tertiary 
education (ISCED 
levels 5 and 6) 
Czech Republic 19.5 48.9 16.1 12.6 
Denmark 14.1 16.6 11.2 13.7 (u) 
Estonia 20.9 32.6 18.7 : 
EU 27 22.8 30.3 20 17.9 
Finland 19 29.7 14.3 : 
The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
53.9 63.1 49.3 61.8 
France 23.8 37.8 21.4 14.7 
Germany 8.1 12.2 5.7 4.4 
Greece 55.3 50.7 58 52.3 
Hungary 28.1 44.7 25.5 18.9 
Iceland 13.5 16.6 8.2 : 
Ireland 30.4 50.4 29.9 17.9 
Italy 35.3 40.2 33 33.3 
Latvia 28.4 44.1 26.5 13.7 (u) 
Lithuania 26.4 36.3 (u) 26.2 21.6 (u) 
Luxembourg 18.8 22.6 16.6 : 
Malta 14.2 22.8 9.9 : 
Netherlands 9.5 13.3 6.8 5.1 
Norway 8.5 10.4 5.8 7.2 
Poland 26.5 33.2 26 22.5 
Portugal 37.7 39.4 35.5 39.1 
Romania 22.7 16.3 25.1 29.1 
Slovakia 34 66 31 29.1 
Slovenia 20.6 29.6 (u) 18.6 21.3 (u) 
Spain 53.2 59.9 49.7 39.8 
Sweden 23.6 38.6 18.1 14.1 
Switzerland 8.4 7.4 9.3 7.9 (u) 
Turkey 15.7 12.6 17.2 25.7 
United Kingdom 21 37.2 18.8 12.6 
Males 
Austria 8.8 11.1 7.5 : 
Belgium 20.4 33.7 15.5 14.1 
Bulgaria 29.5 49.9 27 : 
Croatia 42.3 57.3 (u) 42.1 : 
Cyprus 28.8 33.9 27.2 27.2 (u) 
Czech Republic 19.9 50.8 15.3 17.6 (u) 
Denmark 14.8 17.1 11.6 : 
Estonia 23.4 32.1 20.5 : 
EU 27 23.4 30.5 20.1 17.9 
 14 
Country All ISCED levels  
Pre-primary, 
primary and lower 
secondary 
education (ISCED 
levels 0 to 2) 
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-
tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 3 and 
4) 
First and second 
stage of tertiary 
education (ISCED 
levels 5 and 6) 
Finland 19.9 30.4 15.5 : 
The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
55.2 64.8 51.6 59.7 
France 23.9 37 20.3 15 
Germany 8.8 12.6 6 : 
Greece 48.4 47.2 50.9 34.8 
Hungary 28.8 43.9 25.8 : 
Iceland 14.7 18.9 : : 
Ireland 36.4 56.1 34.3 22.1 
Italy 33.7 38.5 31.2 26.1 
Latvia 27.6 39 24.4 : 
Lithuania 29.9 : 28.4 : 
Luxembourg 18.9 22.5 (u) 16.8 (u) : 
Malta 13.9 19.3 10.1 (u) : 
Netherlands 8.9 11.7 6.7 5.4 
Norway 9.9 11.4 6.9 14.8 (u) 
Poland 24.1 31.4 23 19 (u) 
Portugal 36.4 37.8 34.2 38.1 
Romania 22.3 18.7 24.2 23.8 (u) 
Slovakia 35 64.9 31.5 30.8 (u) 
Slovenia 20.3 29.5 (u) 18.1 : 
Spain 54.4 58.9 52.6 38 
Sweden 25 40.5 19.3 16.5 
Switzerland 8.8 7.9 9.3 9.8 (u) 
Turkey 14.6 13.6 14.6 20.3 
United Kingdom 23.6 37.3 21 16.1 
Females 
Austria 8.7 14.5 6.3 : 
Belgium 18.9 31.1 17.2 14 
Bulgaria 26 40.4 (u) 25.7 : 
Croatia 44.3 67.8 (u) 42.1 52.4 (u) 
Cyprus 26.7 : 21.8 31.6 
Czech Republic 19 45 17.4 10.6 (u) 
Denmark 13.5 16 10.9 : 
Estonia 18 33.7 (u) 16.5 : 
European Union (27 
countries) 22 30 19.8 17.9 
Finland 18 29 13 : 
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia, the 
51.8 58.6 44.7 62.9 
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Country All ISCED levels  
Pre-primary, 
primary and lower 
secondary 
education (ISCED 
levels 0 to 2) 
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-
tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 3 and 
4) 
First and second 
stage of tertiary 
education (ISCED 
levels 5 and 6) 
France 23.7 39.3 22.8 14.4 
Germany 7.3 11.6 5.3 4 
Greece 63.2 58.5 66.3 59.1 
Hungary 27.3 46.5 25.2 21.8 
Iceland 12.3 14.1 9.9 : 
Ireland 24 41.2 24.7 15.3 
Italy 37.5 43.9 35.3 36.6 
Latvia 29.3 56 29.3 : 
Lithuania 21.9 : 22.9 (u) : 
Luxembourg 18.6 23 (u) 16.3 (u) : 
Malta 14.6 29.5 9.8 (u) : 
Netherlands 10 15.1 7 4.9 
Norway 6.9 9.3 4.5 4.6 (u) 
Poland 30 39.5 30.8 24.3 
Portugal 39.2 42.4 36.7 39.5 
Romania 23.2 12.2 26.5 32.4 
Slovakia 32.5 68.6 30 27.9 
Slovenia 21 29.8 (u) 19.3 23.5 (u) 
Spain 51.8 61.6 47 40.8 
Sweden 22.2 36.9 16.8 12.5 
Switzerland 8.1 6.8 9.3 6.6 (u) 
Turkey 17.8 10.2 22.1 30.8 
United Kingdom 18 37 16.6 9.4 
note: (:) data not available, (u) data with low reliability.  
While Table 3 clearly shows that young people are more vulnerable to 
unemployment than older ones, the above table and figure show that within the younger 
demographic less educated individuals are even more vulnerable. In the great majority 
of countries where reliable data is available (14 out of 21) young people with any kind 
of tertiary education have lower levels of unemployment than those who have at most a 
lower secondary education. But there are interesting country-specific deviations from 
the general pattern that can be explained by specificities of the education systems as 
well as rigidities in the labor markets. Figure 2 shows that in every single country 
included the lowest education groups have significantly higher risks of unemployment 
that the higher education groups. With respect to the economic crisis it is interesting to 
see that the times series for German and France show hardly any effect of the crisis on 
youth unemployment whereas in Ireland and Spain the effects were most dramatic. 
Youth unemployment in Ireland among the lowest education group is currently 50 
percent and even 60 percent in Spain. Compared to this the unemployment rate among 
young adults with post-secondary education is 18 percent in Ireland and “only” 40 
percent in Spain. This interesting difference in the extent of the educational 
unemployment differential may have to do with rigidity of the labor market in Spain as 
 16 
compared to that in Ireland unemployment rates of the more highly educated have 
actually declined over the past five years. But even in Spain the reports about massive 
increase of unemployment among university graduates have to be put into perspective. 
The data show that even under the dramatic conditions where overall young 
unemployment is at more than 50 percent those with university education have a 50 
percent better chance of finding a job than those with only basis education. Hence even 
under these extreme conditions a better education still reduces the vulnerability to the 
risk of remaining unemployed. 
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note: data points with low reliability for ISCED levels 5 and 6: Ireland (2002-04), Czech Republic (2000-
11), Hungary (2004-07), Poland (2000), Slovakia (2000-06) and Latvia (2011/2012) 
Figure 2. Youth Unemployment Rate (Ages 15 to 24) for Selected EU Countries, by 
Highest Level of Educational Attainment, 2000 to 2012 (Source: EUROSTAT 
Database) ISCED Levels 0 to 2 = Pre-Primary, Primary and Lower Secondary 
Education; ISCED Levels 3 and 4 = Upper Secondary and Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary 
Education; ISCED Levels 5 and 6 = First and Second Stage of Tertiary Education 
Table 5 below shows comparable data for the United States of America where 
the pattern of youth unemployment fully confirms to the expected general pattern 
described for Europe above. Actually the differentials are even greater than in Europe 
showing that young adults with only high school graduation are about three times more 
likely to be unemployed that young people with a completed Bachelor’s degree. For 
high school dropouts the situation is even much worse with more than 30 percent of 
them being without a job. This is four times the vulnerability as compared to young 
adults with a bachelor degree. 
Table 5. Unemployment Rate of 16- to 24-year-olds, by Educational Attainment, USA, 
2010 (Source: http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012026/tables/table_27.asp, accessed June 
24, 2013) 
Total 
 Less than high school 
completion 
 High school 
completion only 
 Some college or 
associate's degree 
 Bachelor's or 
higher degree  
18.8  30.2  23.0  12.2  7.3  
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In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that with respect to the risk of 
unemployment, young people aged 15-24 tend to be significantly more vulnerable than 
their older peers. But this higher vulnerability does not apply equally to all younger 
people. For all countries for which reliable and comparable statistics could be found – 
unfortunately only for Europe and the USA – by far the highest risk of unemployment 
exists for young men and women with low levels of education. The data also indicates 
that, almost universally, the risk of unemployment monotonically decreases with higher 
levels of education. Hence, particularly in the context of technological advance and 
further automation of production processes, promulgating high quality education which 
also enhances the increasingly sophisticated skills that are demanded in the labor market 
is a key strategy for reducing the vulnerability of young adults to the risk of 
unemployment. 
4 Disability of Adults Aged 30-74 by Level of Education 
As we proceed further through the life course of an individual into adult and mature 
adult age, his or her health status becomes an increasing concern. Both with respect to 
individual life satisfaction and happiness as well as regarding contribution to societal 
productivity, health status and its inverse – the disability status of a person – play an 
increasing pertinent role as one ages. Particularly in the context of population ageing, 
there is increasing concern that the fact that disabilities clearly increase with age will 
lead to a worsening problem of disability in the future. 
There are many factors influencing the health/disability status of a person. They 
range from genetic factors to factors associated with individual lifestyle to quality of 
preventive health care and the curative health care systems of a country. But when it 
comes to observable individual characteristics of people there is overwhelming 
empirical evidence from virtually all countries for which data exist that this risk varies 
greatly by level of education for both men and women (KC & Lentzner 2010). This 
difference is best documented for the case of mortality where in terms of male life 
expectancies, the gap between the highest and lowest educational groups in various 
countries range from as high as 12 years (in Eastern Europe) to 3-4 years (in 
Mediterranean countries). What is less well known and documented is that the 
prevalence of disabilities also tends to vary greatly with the level of education. And 
since falling into disability at the mid-adult age is a much more prevalent risk among 
populations around the world than outright mortality, in this section we will try to 
summarize the evidence with respect to disability rates of adults in the age span 30-74 
for which fairly good data has become available.  
Data for this analysis comes from the World Health Survey (WHS)2, a collection 
of sample surveys of the adult population of 18 years of age and older in 70 countries 
across the globe as shown in appendix Table I. Data was collected in 2002/2003 with 
personal interviews conducted in the local language using standardized survey 
instruments. Respondents provided information on demographic characteristics, health 
status, risk factors, access and utilization of health services and health care expenditure. 
In this analysis, two health status indicators measuring disability (presence or absence) 
were defined based on responses on activity of daily living (ADL) and self-reported 
health (SRH).  
                                                 
2 WHO (2000). The World Health Surveys (WHS). W. H. Organization. Geneva, WHO. 
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As Table 6 shows fourteen per cent of the sample population in Eastern Europe 
was ADL disabled. In the other four regions the proportion of disabled ranged from nine 
per cent in Africa to five per cent in Latin America. These differences are greatly 
influenced by the fact that the population of Europe is on average much older than that 
of Africa. However, in addition to age there are also important differentials with respect 
to level of education. Table 6 shows the percentage of ADL disability in each education 
group in each region for the sample before standardizing by age. As for regional 
differences, Eastern Europe appears to have the highest level of disability followed by 
Africa and Asia, with Latin America and Western Europe showing the lowest levels. 
Eastern Europe also has the highest levels of disability across all levels of education. 
Regional and country differences in levels of disability must be viewed with caution due 
to the subjective nature of the questions and the degree to which cultural and socio-
economic factors may systematically impact reporting. 
Table 6. Proportion of Disabled in Population by Education Level for World Regions 
(Men and Women Aged 30-74) 
Education Africa Asia Western 
Europe 
Latin America Eastern 
Europe 
None 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.37 
Primary 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.29 
Secondary 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.12 
Tertiary 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09 
   Total 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.14 
 
Table 7 shows the odds ratios resulting from a regression of ADL disability on 
age and education, separately for females and males. All values are significant at the 
0.05 level or higher except for those identified by “ns” (not significant). The odds of 
reporting severe or extreme difficulty in mobility or self-care clearly increases by age; 
for eastern European females the odds increase rapidly with age, almost nine times as 
likely at age 60-69 compared with women at age 30-39 and almost three times as likely 
for Asian and Latin American females. For men, as age increases the odds at age 60-69 
increase by as much as six times in Western and Eastern Europe compared with the 
odds at age 30-39.  
For both sexes and in all five regions (except for Eastern European males with at 
least a secondary education), the prevalence of disability declined significantly with 
increasing education. The odds of reporting ADL disability for a woman with no 
education compared with a woman with primary education is the highest (more than 
double) in Latin America (2.43 times) and least in Africa (1.19 times); for women with 
at least secondary education, the odds ratio is the least (less than half) in Asia (0.46) and 
the highest in eastern Europe (0.82). These odds ratios can be used to calculate odds (or 
proportion) of reporting ADL disability for any combination of age and education 
groups for the different world regions. For example, the odds for a woman aged 50-59 
reporting ADL disability with at least secondary education in Africa is 1.29 (2.08 times 
0.62 as given in Table 7). This implies that these women have on average a 29 percent 
higher probability of disability than the reference category which is women aged 30-39 
with only primary education. 
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Table 7. Regression of ADL on Age and Education: Odds Ratio by World Region 
   Africa Asia Western 
Europe 
Latin America Eastern 
Europe 
Female 
 Age      
 30-39 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 40-49 1.39 1.27 1.62 1.55 2.58 
 50-59 2.08 1.82 3.39 1.91 3.82 
 60-69 3.49 2.92 4.07 2.92 8.77 
 70-74 5.74 6.37 11.07 4.81 21.3 
Education 
 None 1.19 1.74 1.93 2.43 1.73 
 Primary 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 At Least 
Secondary 
0.62 0.46 0.53 0.52 0.82 
Male       
 Age      
 30-39 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 40-49 1.09 1.58 1.39 0.93 2.87 
 50-59 1.8ns 2.80 3.93ns 1.85ns 3.89 
 60-69 3.26 4.50 6.02 3.16 6.19 
 70-74 5.65 6.41 7.89 6.46 14.45 
Education 
 None 1.38 1.21 2.00 2.35 2.56 
 Primary 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  At Least 
Secondary 
0.75 0.65 0.88 0.61 0.64ns 
Note: All values are significant at the 0.05 level or higher except for those identified by 
ns. 
Table 8 shows our analysis extended to include results for ten individual 
countries in different world regions. In general, the pattern of odds ratios above 1 for 
individuals with no education and below 1 for those with at least a secondary education 
persists across these countries. Five of the countries—Brazil, Philippines, Russia, South 
Africa and Turkey—all displayed these relationships for both men and women, 
although the values were not always statistically significantly different. In Vietnam, a 
similar pattern was evident, although none of the odds ratios were statistically 
significant. In a few countries including Pakistan some of the differences turn out to be 
insignificant which is likely to be due to small number of cases in those education 
categories. For example, in Pakistan there were only three women aged 60+ with at 
least a secondary education in the sample and none of them reported ADL disability.  
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Table 8. Regression ADL Disability on Age and Education for 10 Selected Developing 
Countries: Odds Ratio for Men and Women Aged 30-74 
Females Males 
 No education Primary At least secondary No education Primary 
At least 
secondary 
Brazil 2.36 1.00 0.45  2.23 1.00 0.55 
China 3.24 1.00 2.22ns  3.97 1.00 0.61ns 
Ethiopia 0.86ns 1.00 0.70ns  2.18 1.00 1.19ns 
India 0.90ns 1.00 0.50  0.91ns 1.00 0.65 
Pakistan 3.42ns 1.00 2.37ns  0.73ns 1.00 0.36 
Philippines 1.93 1.00 0.47  1.26ns 1.00 0.50 
Russia 3.25 1.00 0.94ns  8.96ns 1.00 0.64ns 
South Africa 1.16ns 1.00 0.34  2.50 1.00 0.66ns 
Turkey 2.13 1.00 0.40  1.61 1.00 0.38 
Vietnam 1.49ns 1.00 0.34ns  1.51ns 1.00 0.64ns 
Note: All values are significant at the 0.05 level or higher except for those identified by 
ns.  
In the introduction we stressed that there is a strong case for assuming functional 
causality for the effects of education on health. For this reason it makes sense to assume 
that these differentials also hold for the future. One may argue that the differentials may 
change as over time increasingly large segments of the population receive more 
education. But at least with respect to educational mortality differentials – where time 
series data exist – rapid expansions in overall education have not led to a narrowing of 
the differentials. In some cases the differentials actually seem to have widened over 
time. Hence, as a simple benchmark in the following simulation exercise we assume a 
constant pattern of age- and education-specific disability rates. 
4.1 Projecting the Level of Adult Disability 
In this section we look at the potential impact of the growth of formal education on 
adult health across broad geographical regions. We do so by contrasting the 
conventional approach that only differentiates by age and sex with an education-specific 
approach that explicitly includes education differentials as a source of population 
heterogeneity in addition to age and sex. As will be seen, the future looks very different 
under these two approaches. 
For both projections we used the Wittgenstein Centre’s world population 
projections by age, sex, and education for the period 2010-2100 (KC et al. 2010) as the 
numerical basis. We first applied a constant age/sex profile of ADL disability without 
considering our observed educational differentials and then applied this to the projection 
of the future age and sex structure of the population. In a second set of calculations we 
factored in the education/disability relationships obtained from the WHS analysis 
above. We did so for the three different education scenarios as described below. More 
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than 100 countries (covering approximately 90 per cent of the world’s population) were 
grouped into five regions for this exercise. The population projections themselves are 
extensively documented elsewhere (Lutz et al. Forthcoming) and need not be described 
here. 
The results of these alternative projections of disability are shown in Figure 3 for 
women aged 30-74 for three selected world regions. Without factoring in education and 
only considering the age pattern of disability (labeled as NES – No Education Scenario) 
the conventional forecast appears that shows a significant increase in future disability 
rates simply as a function of rapid population ageing combined with the fact that older 
people have a higher prevalence of ADL. This projected increase is particularly strong 
in Asia where due to the rapid speed of fertility decline, population ageing over the 
coming decades will be even faster than in most other continents; it is also very 
pronounced in the figure for Western Europe. Since the population in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is still very young and continues to grow rapidly over the coming decades, this 
ageing effect is only visible in the longer run. 
Once education is explicitly factored into the model the picture looks completely 
different. With education taken into account, under all three scenarios there will actually 
be reductions in disability by 2050 for adult women aged 30-74. Again, the gap between 
the two kinds of projections is most pronounced for Asia. The reason for this lies in the 
fact that paralleling rapid population ageing in Asia, the elderly population will also be 
much better educated than today’s elderly. This in turn is a result of the very rapid 
expansion of schooling among young Asians over the past decades. In some countries 
(including e.g. South Korea and China) in the 1960s a majority of the adult population 
still had no formal schooling at all. Today the young cohorts are very well educated and 
even among the best educated in the world in Korea. As a consequence, today’s elderly 
still have a very low levels of education and we know for sure that the future elderly 
will be much better educated. This finding holds for all three future education scenarios. 
As shown by the CEN (Constant Enrollment Numbers) Scenario, even no further 
improvements in school result in a much lower level of overall disability than when 
education is simply not factored into the model, i.e. when the apparent heterogeneity by 
level of education is disregarded. The most rapid improvement in disability is clearly 
shown under the very optimistic FT (Fast Track) scenario. 
Of the three regions, in Africa the picture is a bit different because of the still 
rapid population growth. Under the very pessimistic CEN scenario – which assumes 
that no new schools are being built – the educational composition of the population 
actually worsens over time due to larger and larger young cohorts. As a consequence of 
the worsening education of the younger generation over time, this scenario will also 
result in lower education of the adult population and hence higher disability under our 
model. Under the medium GET (Global Education Trend) and the very optimistic FT 
scenarios, the future prevalence of disability is also expected to decrease for Africa. 
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Figure 3. Projected Prevalence of ADL Disability for Women Aged 30-74 in Asia, 
Western Europe and Africa 
In conclusion, this section on adult disability has clearly demonstrated that the 
vulnerability of men and women, in terms of falling into disability, not only varies 
greatly among countries and across age groups but there are also significant and 
consistent differences with respect to the level of education. The scenarios presented 
above also show that the future looks very different once education is explicitly factored 
in. Instead of the ubiquitous projections that show massive increases of future disability 
rates as a consequence of population ageing, this analysis shows that we can actually 
expect declining adult disability for women aged 30-74 even in the rapidly ageing 
populations of Asia and Western Europe. This also has important consequences beyond 
individual health and well-being in so far as it may allow people to stay longer in the 
labor force and increase the productive potential of ageing societies.  
5 Differential Vulnerability to Natural Disasters by Level of Education 
In this fourth and final section of the paper we will address the vulnerability to natural 
disasters which can also be viewed as a proxy for likely future vulnerability to possible 
consequences of climate change. Vulnerability to natural disasters is of significant 
interest in its own right as a source of premature death, particularly in developing 
countries. But it becomes even more relevant when we assume the mechanisms by 
which such  vulnerability is either enhanced or reduced are isomorphic to those that 
affect the resilience or vulnerability to  likely future  climate change. Hence, this study 
of differential vulnerability has significant relevance beyond the specific disasters 
studied. In other words, if we have a better understanding of the risk factors associated 
with currently observed vulnerabilities to natural disasters, we can draw conclusions 
about the risk factors associated with future climate change, in particular with respect to 
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the likely higher frequency and intensity of tropical storms, extreme flooding events and 
severe droughts.  
This vulnerability affects people at all stages of their life course although the 
intensity of the risk also tends to differ by age. While there is some evidence that people 
at the very beginning (when they are babies) and at the very end of their life cycle 
(when they are frail elderly) are more vulnerable because they directly depend on the 
help of others, for the years in between other factors tend to dominate the differentiation 
of risk. These factors range from household characteristics associated with economic 
standing (such as the construction and stability of the house) to the ecological setting of 
the house to individual behavioral variables. One individual characteristic that in the 
past has not received enough attention in risk studies is the level of educational 
attainment. Recently a series of studies has clearly demonstrated the decisive role of 
education in reducing such risks.  
In general, in the field of population-environment interactions there is increasing 
recognition that people not only differ with respect to their contribution to climate 
change but also in their adaptive capacity. A recent summary states: “The evidence is 
clear that demographic differences fundamentally affect people’s contributions to 
environmental burdens, their ability to participate in sustainable development, and their 
adaptability to a changing environment” (From the statement of an international 
scientific panel as published in Science, Lutz et al. (2012)). The future adaptive 
capacities of societies and the differential vulnerability of their members are one of the 
least studied aspects of the important question of how dangerous climate change will be 
for future human well-being. For example, several studies that try to assess the impact 
of climate change on future malaria deaths in Eastern Africa combine the projected 
changed climate conditions for 2080 with today’s public health capabilities, population 
distributions, human capital, and general adaptive capacities. But such assessments can 
be misleading since we know that not only will the climate likely change over the 
coming decade but also that demographic structures and associated socioeconomic 
capabilities will definitely change. 
The central hypothesis to being addressed in this section is that education can 
play an important role in reducing the negative impacts of extreme climate events on 
human mortality. Education is considered as one important way individuals acquire 
knowledge, skills, and competencies that can directly or indirectly influence their 
adaptive capacity. Most directly, literacy and numerical skills obtained through formal 
education imply better access to relevant information, such as early warnings for 
tropical storms or seasonal prediction of drought (Patt et al. 2007; Moser & Ekstrom 
2010). Second, there is evidence that education also enhances cognitive skills and the 
willingness to change risky behavior while at the same time extending the personal 
planning horizon (Behrman & Stacey 1997; Neisser et al. 1996; Nisbett 2009). 
Education enhances the acquisition of knowledge, influencing values and priorities as 
well as the capacity to plan for the future and improve allocation of resources (Glewwe 
1999; Thomas et al. 1991). Besides that, as described in the previous section on 
disability, education leads to better health and physical wellbeing (Fuchs et al. 2010; 
Baker et al. 2011; KC & Lentzner 2010) and is positively related to ‘life’ skills (e.g. 
basic practical knowledge on nutrition and health practices, government institutions, 
and organization) as well as problem-solving skills (Moll 1994; Ishikawa & Ryan 2002; 
Schnell-Anzola et al. 2005). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that when facing 
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natural hazards or climate risks, educated individuals are more empowered and hence 
more adaptive in their response to, preparation for, and recovery from disasters. 
Furthermore, better educated societies have greater social, economic, and institutional 
capabilities necessary for successful adaptation to climatic change (KC & Lutz 2013). 
When the effects of education are being studied, often the question of 
endogeneity arises. At the aggregate level, there can be either reverse causality or joint 
determination of the factors studied. Societies with high average level of education 
generally tend to be more developed and perform well in other development indicators 
such as health and living standards. It could therefore be possible to assume that the 
apparently positive effects of education on reducing vulnerability were actually the 
results of, for example, better infrastructure and health facilities in a country. To study 
this issue it is necessary to explicitly include these other factors into the analysis.  
At the individual level in addition to the possibility of reverse causation there is 
also the possibility that the effect could be explained by selectivity (e.g. that certain 
stronger individuals become both better educated and more resilient to disasters). This 
topic of endogeneity and causality in the effects of education, both at the individual and 
societal level, is extensively discussed by Lutz and Skirbekk (forthcoming – Chapter 2). 
It should be pointed out that when assessing the effect of educational attainment, the 
issue of identifying the direction of the effect is made significantly easier by the fact 
that the time when the educational attainment was reached (through schooling) tends to 
be significantly earlier than the time at which vulnerability is assessed. Hence when we 
study the vulnerability of a 50-year old woman, her educational attainment was on 
average achieved more than 30 years earlier and his hence independent of the possible 
effects of recent disasters on the school system or her individual chance to have 
received an education. Hence, in the spirit of the discussion at the beginning of the 
paper, there are many good reasons to assume that there is indeed functional causality in 
the effect of more education on reducing vulnerability.  
It has recently been acknowledged that the impacts of climate change are not 
distributed evenly across population groups and countries (Parry et al. 2007). 
Accordingly, extant research has investigated socio-demographic differences in impacts 
of, responses to, and recovery from natural disasters and extreme climate events. It has 
commonly been found that the poor, elderly, children, women, and ethnic 
minorities/immigrants are the most vulnerable groups (Clark et al. 1998). The elderly, 
children, and women typically have less physical strength and ability to escape from 
danger comparing to men at prime ages (Yeh 2010). The poor and people belonging to 
minority groups for their part are more likely to live in poor housing conditions and 
disaster-prone areas. Mortality and morbidity from natural disasters are much higher 
among these subpopulations (Neumayer & Plümper 2007; Frankenberg et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, low-income groups generally face more obstacles during the phases of 
response, recovery, and reconstruction (Masozera et al. 2007). Consequently, studies on 
social vulnerability commonly highlight poverty/income as a main characteristic 
explaining inequalities in all aspects of disasters (Fothergill & Peek 2004). 
At the macro level, economic inequalities in impacts from natural disasters have 
also been reported across communities, regions, and nations (Cavallo & Noy 2010). 
Fatalities in low-income countries are generally much higher than those of higher 
income nations (Kahn 2005) while macroeconomic recovery is slower in the former as 
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compared to the latter (Noy 2009). However, apart from economic factors, recent 
studies show that social characteristics such as literacy levels, degree of openness to 
foreign trade, and political environment are also associated with disaster impact (Toya 
& Skidmore 2007; Noy 2009). This suggests that income alone does not explain 
differential vulnerability. Likewise, the findings that countries with higher levels of 
education suffer less from the impacts of natural disasters imply that investment in 
human capital may be a practical tool to prepare for an increasing number of extreme 
climate events. 
5.1 New Empirical Evidence  
Based on the above described rationale, we hypothesize that formal education could 
directly or indirectly reduce vulnerability and enhance adaptive capacity. Recent efforts 
in that direction span empirical analysis ranging from individual-and household-level 
analyses to village-level studies and national case studies, as well as global-level time 
series analysis. 
An individual level study of disaster preparedness during the 2012 Indian Ocean 
earthquakes of 557 households located along the Andaman coast in Phang Nga province 
finds that formal education – measured at the individual, household, and community 
levels – increases the likelihood of preparedness actions being taken (Muttarak & 
Pothisiri 2013). Having been affected by the 2004 tsunami clearly increases emergency 
preparedness but for the group of persons without such disaster experience, education 
turned out to be a relevant factor in anticipating the risk and taking preparedness 
actions. 
Another recent study at the individual level by Frankenberg et al. (2013) 
examines the extent to which education serves as a means of protection against natural 
disaster using longitudinal survey data collected in two provinces on the island of 
Sumatra, Indonesia, before and after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. They find that 
education clearly plays a role in coping with the disaster over the longer term with the 
better educated being of better psycho-social health five years after the tsunami. They 
are less likely than others to live under precarious living conditions and appear to be 
better at compensating for loss of income following the tsunami. 
Similar evidence on the association between education and vulnerability has 
been reported at the community level. KC (2013) finds strong effects of education using 
comprehensive village level data in Nepal (a microsample of the 2001 census covering 
2.5 million individuals together with disaster data for 2000-2009) on damages due to 
floods and landslides in terms of human lives lost, animals lost, and other damage to 
households. Comparing the effect of education with those of income and wealth, the 
author concludes that education has a stronger and more consistent impact in reducing 
damage due to floods and landslides in Nepal.  
Similarly, a study by Garbero and Muttarak (2013) investigates the impacts of 
floods and droughts on community welfare in Thailand. Based on the Thai government 
surveys of living conditions and life quality of 68,695 rural villages for 2009- 2011, the 
paper uses difference-in-difference methods to analyze how floods and droughts in 2010 
affected consumption and income of the villages in 2011. It finds that communities with 
higher educational attainment did not experience a reduction in consumption, 
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investment in agriculture, and education, nor a decline in income. A further analysis 
demonstrates that communities with high levels of education are more able to secure 
available government financial aid for areas affected by floods and droughts. 
Another study by Muttarak et al. (2012) on 286 villages in Phang Nga province 
in Thailand, chosen for its most severe losses from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 
shows that preparation for extreme climate events and natural disasters are driven by 
past experience and anticipation of such events in the future. In addition, villages with a 
higher proportion of village members with at least secondary education are more likely 
to prepare for potential natural disasters.  
Likewise, Pichler and Striessnig (2013) use data from qualitative interviews 
conducted in Cuba and the Dominican Republic to compare these two island states with 
regard to disaster vulnerability. Even though they are fairly similar in their exposure to 
natural extreme events, disaster outcomes vary greatly between the two islands. While 
effective disaster response is strongly embedded in the entire Cuban population, which 
is one of the most educated in the developing world, the interviews strongly confirm 
that lack of education and literacy in the Dominican Republic makes people more 
vulnerable and prevents them from even understanding warnings about upcoming 
danger. 
Using national level time series of disaster fatalities around the world, a recent 
study by Striessnig et al. (2013) finds significant evidence for the role of education – 
particularly female education – in reducing disaster fatalities while there is no evidence 
for the widely assumed role of income per capita in reducing vulnerability after 
controlling for other key determinants of socio-economic development as well as 
exposure to risk. Table 9 shows an update of this multi-variate statistical analysis with 
newer data for a larger number of countries (158) and a larger number of alternative 
models for the period 1980 to 2010 across 152 countries for which data were available. 
The dependent variable is the log of disaster deaths. The sources of data and definitions 
of variables are explained in detail in Striessnig et al. (2013). Here it suffices to say that 
in addition to controlling for the number of disasters (as a proxy for exposure) and for 
population size as a scale parameter, the rate of population growth (for demographic 
change), and a polity score (for quality of governance), the different models have been 
defined to assess the relative importance of three different factors of human 
development: Economic growth (as measured by GDP per capita), the development of 
public health (as best captured by lagged infant mortality to avoid endogeneity) and the 
proportion of women aged 20-39 with at least secondary education ( a human capital 
indicator that has been shown to be most sensitive in other contexts). 
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Table 9. Determinants of National Death from Natural Disaster. Panel regression for 152 countries over 10-year intervals between 1980 and 2010 
using time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of deaths per capita. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on the 
heteroskedasticity-reistant and autocorrelation-resistant covariance matrix. Other independent variables not reported here are dummy variables 
for 18 world regions.           Significance codes: 0.01 = ***; 0.05 = **; 0.1 = * 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        Constant -2.252*** -2.983*** -1.227 -3.100*** -1.253 -1.932** -2.062** 
 (0.774) (0.761) (0.838) (0.788) (0.841) (0.868) (0.876) 
Log (#Disasters) 1.650*** 1.562*** 1.569*** 1.574*** 1.578*** 1.535*** 1.555*** 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.120) (0.120) (0.118) (0.119) 
Pop Growth Rate 1.401*** 1.220*** 0.987** 1.076** 0.873* 1.037** 0.745 
 (0.517) (0.449) (0.455) (0.512) (0.527) (0.452) (0.525) 
Log (Lagged Pop) 0.252*** 0.300*** 0.266*** 0.296*** 0.262*** 0.288*** 0.278*** 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
Polity Score -0.376*** -0.233* -0.320** -0.238* -0.326** -0.226* -0.234* 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.130) (0.134) (0.131) (0.133) (0.134) 
GDP per Capita (1000s) -0.005 
  
0.006 0.005 
 
0.012 
 (0.010) 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
Lagged IMR 
 
0.010*** 
 
0.011*** 
 
0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Female 20-39 Sec+Edu 
  
-1.472*** 
 
-1.523*** -1.076** -1.173*** 
 
  
(0.414) 
 
(0.431) (0.434) (0.443) 
 
       Deviance 1.135.210 1.100.223 1.104.476 1.099.509 1.104.081 1.087.360 1.084.830 
AIC 2.010.264 1.993.109 1.995.223 1.994.753 1.997.027 1.988.664 1.989.388 
BIC 2.130.839 2.113.685 2.115.799 2.119.635 2.121.909 2.113.546 2.118.576 
N 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 
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These results support earlier findings that human development is positively 
associated with reduced disaster vulnerability at the national level. However, the three 
dimensions of human development turn out to be of very different relative importance. 
GDP per capita turns out to be insignificant in all models while infant mortality and 
female education turn out to be highly significant in all models with the expected signs. 
Higher infant mortality as an indicator of weaker public health is associated with 
relatively more disaster fatalities and higher levels of female education are shown to be 
a dominant determinant of reducing disaster vulnerability. In particular, these results 
clearly show that at least at the aggregate level of national time series, the ubiquitous 
assumption that GDP was a key determinant disaster vulnerability finds no empirical 
support while female education as determinant is strongly confirmed. 
The remaining part of this section converts these findings into alternative 
scenarios for possible future disaster vulnerability in Sub-Saharan Africa depending on 
three different scenarios of future education trends (results for 19 other world regions 
are available on request). These three education scenarios were defined in the 
introduction of this paper. In Figure 4 we posit two alternative assumptions about the 
future trends in disaster hazard by combining our results from Model 7, which was 
chosen based on model selection criteria, with the population and education projections 
according to these three education scenarios. In the picture on the left, we assume that 
over the decades to come Sub-Saharan Africa will be exposed to “Constant Hazard”; 
that is, the number of registered disasters as experienced in the 2000-2010 time period 
will remain stable. Already in this depiction, the future of education makes a huge 
difference, not only in the population at risk, but also in the projected decadal number of 
deaths due to disasters which by the end of the prediction horizon in the CER scenario 
is more than double the predicted number of deaths in the FT scenario. 
The potential to save lives through education becomes even more obvious under 
a hypothetical “Climate Change” scenario, which is operationalized by assuming a 
constant 10 percent increase per decade in the frequency of natural disaster events in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. While in the FT scenario the increase in educational attainment is 
still able to offset the effect of the assumed increase in hazard on future disaster 
fatalities, the assumption of a world evolving according to the CER scenario predicts an 
exponential increase in fatalities to extreme events. By 2050, the predicted decadal 
number of casualties in the CER scenario reaches 1132000, a 50 percent increase 
compared to the figure predicted by the GET scenario and more than twice the figure 
predicted by the FT scenario. 
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Figure 4. Predicted Number of Deaths (in 1000s) Due to Natural Extreme Events in sub-
Saharan Africa Assuming “Constant Hazard” (left) and “Climate Change” (right) under 
the Constant Enrolment Rate (CER) Scenario, Global Education Trend (GET) Scenario, 
and Fast Track (FT) Scenario 
These are of course highly stylized scenario calculations. Since assessments of 
the future frequency of natural disasters around the world depend on myriad factors 
such as geography, type of disaster, or societies’ capacities to prevent them from 
happening in the first place, to name just a few, the IPCC is still careful in quantifying 
the effect of climate change on the number of natural extreme events. There seems to be 
a consensus, however, on an upward trend in frequency of appearance with regard to 
almost any type of disaster as a consequence of sea level rise or higher mean 
temperature. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012). The assumption of 
constant hazards is thus rather unlikely to hold and many climate change researchers 
may think that the assumed increase of 10 percent per decade in the “Climate Change” 
scenario is far too conservative for the more distant future when the negative effects of 
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climate change may accelerate. In such a case, the calculated effects contingent on the 
assumed future hazard levels will be proportionately higher than in the examples shown 
above.  
In any case, even an increase of 10 percent per decade results in a dramatic rise 
in fatalities and highlights the potential for near term investments in education to reduce 
these risks. 
These new insights about the important role of education for adaptive capacity 
presented in this section are already reflected in the new SSP (Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways) scenarios that have been produced by a joint effort of the international 
Integrated Assessment (IA) community to serve as a common reference point for IPCC 
related modeling (O’Neill et al. Forthcoming). Much more context-specific analysis of 
differential vulnerabilities and the role of demographic factors including education is 
needed in order to arrive at robust country-specific forecasts and policy 
recommendations. In general, however, there can be no doubt that universal basic 
education of the entire population (including basic literacy and numeracy) is a key 
factor in enhancing the adaptive capacity and reducing the vulnerability of individuals, 
communities, and entire nations. Hence, when it comes to the choice of priorities for 
investments in adaptation, the currently favored engineering solutions should be 
critically compared to the long term benefits of investing in human capital formation 
and the general empowerment to flexibly and effectively react to partly still uncertain 
location specific climate change effects. 
In conclusion, in this paper we have shown that over the entire life cycle of 
individuals the changes in behavior that tend to be associated with more education (of 
mothers or the persons themselves) can be viewed as a potent factor in reducing child 
mortality, reducing the risk for unemployment at young age, reducing the vulnerability 
to natural disasters, and finally reducing the risk of falling into disability. These general 
long-term benefits of near-term investments in education hold for individuals as well as 
for entire societies. 
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7 Appendix 
Table I. WHS Countries Used in the Analysis by Region 
Africa Asia Western Europe Eastern Europe Latin America 
Burkina Faso Bangladesh Austria Georgia Brazil 
Chad China Belgium Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Dominican Rep. 
Comoros India Denmark Croatia Ecuador 
Congo Israel Finland Czech Republic Guatemala 
Ivory Coast Kazakhstan France Estonia Mexico 
Ethiopia Laos Germany Hungary Paraguay 
Ghana Malaysia Greece Latvia Uruguay 
Kenya Myanmar Ireland Russia  
Malawi Nepal Italy Slovakia  
Mali Pakistan Luxembourg Slovenia  
Mauritania Philippines Netherlands Ukraine  
Mauritius Sri Lanka Norway   
Morocco Turkey Portugal   
Namibia UAE Spain   
Senegal Vietnam Sweden   
South Africa  United Kingdom   
Swaziland  Australia   
Tunisia     
Zambia     
Zimbabwe     
 
Table II shows the regional distributions of the sample population by age, sex, and level 
of education. Europe has by far the oldest population, about one-fifth in the 30-39 age 
group and a little less than two-fifths at 65 and older, whereas Africa has the youngest 
adult population with about two-fifths in the 30-39 age group and 20 per cent aged 60+. 
The educational disparities are striking, with the proportions of those with no education 
ranging from 46 per cent in Africa, 27 per cent in Asia, and 7 per cent in Latin America 
to 2 per cent in Europe. Each of the regions had more women than men in the sample. 
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Table II. Age, Sex, and Education Structure in the Sample 
Sample (proportion) 
    Africa Asia Western 
Europe 
Latin America Eastern Europe 
Age      
 30-39 19083 (38%) 23561 (36%) 4574 (22%) 15902 (34%) 2980 (20%) 
 40-49 12685 (26%) 18225 (28%) 4548 (22%) 11539 (25%) 3388 (23%) 
 50-59 7997 (16%) 11025 (17%) 4047 (19%) 8006 (17%) 2958 (20%) 
 60-69 5490 (11%) 7233 (11%) 3783 (18%) 5860 (13%) 2710 (18%) 
  70+ 4389 (9%) 4557 (7%) 4042 (19%) 4825 (10%) 2912 (19%) 
Sex      
 Female 26618 (54%) 34882 (54%) 12308 (59%) 26015 (56%) 9407 (63%) 
  Male 23026 (46%) 29719 (46%) 8686 (41%) 20117 (44%) 5541 (37%) 
Education      
 None 23012 (46%) 17694 (27%) 610 (3%) 3012 (7%) 191 (1%) 
 Primary 17541 (35%) 22989 (36%) 5371 (26%) 15765 (34%) 2095 (14%) 
 Secondary 6895 (14%) 17569 (27%) 10939 (52%) 25559 (55%) 8563 (57%) 
 Tertiary 2196 (4%) 6349 (10%) 4074 (19%) 1796 (4%) 4099 (27%) 
Total 49644 (100%) 64601 (100%) 20994 (100%) 46132 (100%) 14948 (100%) 
 
 
 
